On Wednesday, the State of New York filed its brief in opposition to the appeal filed by the UFC in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. New York addresses Zuffa’s contentions related to its appeal related to the Southern District Court of New York’s dismissal of Zuffa’s lawsuit last March.
The two primary claims related to the First Amendment and Vagueness challenge to the state law law prohibiting MMA in the state. The state liquor law also is challenged in the appeal.
First Amendment
Violence was the key to the state’s argument that the First Amendment did not apply to the law banning MMA in New York. “The First Amendment does not protect violence,” it argued in its brief citing the fact that the state has the power to regulate violent or dangerous conduct that can inflict actual physical harm.
Distinguishing fighting from speech, it notes that the combat prohibition restricts physical violence and not what they may or may not say. It argues that the legislative intent of the law was to regulate particular forms of violent conduct rather than speech.
Moreover, it argues that in states that allow MMA, or other dangerous contact sports, they require strict rules to abide by and fighters must obtain a license. These requirements, according to the argument, would be contrary to First Amendment protection.
Throughout the brief, New York takes jabs at Zuffa’s appeal brief. For instance, it states that it misreads the statute in its belief that the regulation prohibiting MMA is limited to just a “live performance” (i.e., fighting in front of an audience). It argues that the interpretation is wrong. In fact, New York argues that the ban prohibits “physical violence regardless of whether anyone watches the fights.”
It notes that the ban extends beyond conduct of an MMA event in front of an audience:
…the professional combat prohibition is violated any time contestants compete for a monetary prize by engaging in unlawful physical combat—whether the fight takes place in a living room, on the street, or at Madison Square Garden— since the harms caused by such physical violence are present regardless of the size or even existence of an audience. Thus, an ultimate fighting match at a gym with a $100 prize violates the ban even if nobody comes to see such a low-stakes contest. A private fight club in which combatants engage in no-holds-barred fighting with the winner receiving $10,000 would also violate the professional combat prohibition, even if there is no public audience (p. 38 of New York appeal brief)
In the alternative, New York stated that if the First Amendment applied, regulation would be permissible because it would support a governmental interest in preventing serious injuries and death. Here, New York points to the Legislative History in the 1990s when MMA was in its infancy stages and how less rules than before. In this instance, the argument goes that New York may inhibit a First Amendment right if it is incidental to the governmental interest of safety. So, even if it was determined that MMA deserved First Amendment protection, the law banning it would stand because New York has a right to protect people from fighting.
Vagueness
The second major argument in the brief addresses whether the law is vague. First, New York reaffirms the district court ruling that Zuffa lacked standing since there was no claim or injury until after the lawsuit commenced. Next, it argued that the correct court to address this issue would be New York state court since it dealt with a New York law. This was the same guidance stated by Judge Kimba Wood in its order dismissing Zuffa’s lawsuit last March.
New York states that if the court believes Zuffa has standing and a state court is not the appropriate forum for the case, then it should remand (send back) to the district court to decide whether the “martial-arts sponsorship exemption is vague as applied to ultimate fighting. This was the same thing Zuffa recommended in its brief. It also suggested that the appeals court could decide that the exemption was not unconstitionally vague.
Payout Perspective:
New York attempts to distance itself from the First Amendment issue contending that the ban relates to the overarching concern of safety. It seems that the brief focuses on violence rather than describing MMA as sport. Throughout the brief, it offers subtle descriptions and analogies of violence. While New York argues that it has a right to regulate violence and dangerous conduct, the correlations it makes in its brief relate to activities that are mostly criminal. Thus, the argument here seem to fall flat as laws that regulate animal fighting or use of weapons are against the law. Is MMA on the level of these activities?
As for the Vagueness claim, this issue seems to be one that might be the point of contention. While New York offers the “lack of standing” argument, it also identifies a potential key mistake by Zuffa. It notes that the case may be best decided by a state court. Finally, it focuses on legislative history and intent in arguing that the law was always about banning MMA.
How will this appeal be handled in light of the Preliminary Injunction filed in the other UFC lawsuit against New York? For those interested in legal theory and constitutional law, this case offers several interesting legal theories to explore.
Zuffa will have a chance to offer a Reply to New York’s brief.
MMA Payout will keep you posted.
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